Congressional Report on the Snowden Disclosures

Congressional Report on the Snowden Disclosures

On September 15, 2016, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released its summary report on the disclosures of Edward Snowden.  The report attempts to discredit Snowden in several ways that are familiar to many whistleblowers, by saying:

-          He was not a real whistleblower because he did not present his complaints using the official procedures available to him. 

-          He had no reason to fear retribution for making the proper disclosures because laws were available to protect him. 

-          He used illegitimate means to gather much of the evidence he disclosed.

-          He began mass downloads of classified documents in response to being reprimanded for his workplace behavior, not due to high ethical or legal concerns.

-          He is a serial exaggerator and fabricator, whose official employment records revealed intentional lying.

Although not a whistleblower of Snowden’s stature, I found that many of my complaints were lost or claimed not to have been filed properly.  Many whistleblowers, particularly those in the government intelligence business, soon discover that protections are far less effective than promised.  Many recent whistleblowers have been accused of getting their proof of wrongdoing through unfair means, and my attorney advised not introducing evidence, which he thought was acquired illegitimately, because it might make an “unclean hands” defense available to HomeFirst.  Most companies, including HomeFirst, claim that their whistleblowers were impolite, insubordinate, incompetent, or otherwise unsuited for their position.  In summary, Snowden was no whistleblowing angel, but, as he tweeted, Congress took two years to come up with a pretty paltry list of criticisms. 

Whether the whistleblower or the organization is the better truth-teller is key to deciding how to address the whistleblower’s complaints.  The Committee report contends that Snowden’s disclosures damaged U.S. national security and that most of his disclosures related to critical international military and intelligence programs, not domestic individual privacy interests.  Snowden contends that the positive value of his disclosures far outweighs any possible negative security consequences.  As in any whistleblower-organization conflict, including my own with HomeFirst, it is difficult for an outsider to know who is telling the truth.

It seems plausible that some of the 1.5 million Snowden documents were not pertinent to the law-breaking that he aimed to expose.  Based on my experience on having relatively miniscule secret computer access at HomeFirst, I can imagine the temptation to gather more and more surprising, titillating, and embarrassing documents once one has begun to look around. 

Chelsea Manning’s disclosures, for example, included Ellsberg-like revelations that addressed the conduct of the U.S. war in Iraq to which he objected, but they also included cables that did little more than reveal the embarrassing opinions of some U.S. diplomats.  It is sometimes difficult even for the whistleblower to know when her case is made and data collection should stop.

It is probably safe to say, given their scope and the public response, that many of Snowden’s disclosures had legitimate public value even though some in power would still object.  His revelations of those matters provided a public service, as many, including Eric Holder, now admit.  They were illegal, but their public benefit may reasonably merit Snowden a presidential pardon.

At the same time, it is likely that some of Snowden’s disclosures were not so legitimate.  In those cases, his critics may be correct in saying that he damaged our national security.  It is even possible that his motives were, at least in part, dishonorable because they sought – intentionally or not – to embarrass or otherwise harm U.S. or international intelligence agencies.  Unless mitigated by the rewards for his public service, these disclosures may justify his punishment or make pardon impossible.

Almost every whistleblower’s situation involves ambiguities similar to those in Snowden’s case, albeit on a smaller scale.  Most of us say and do things that merit criticism although we find justifications.  Most of us plan our collection of evidence and the way we will disclose the wrongdoing, although few to the degree that Snowden did, using secure communications with selected journalists and concocting plans to escape to foreign countries.

Like Snowden, each of us chooses our course for good or faulty reasons.  Many suffer as a result of those choices.  Some probably could have reduced our suffering by approaching our projects differently.  Snowden reduced his pain by leaving the country before making his disclosures.  I suffered relatively little: I experienced some emotional stress and lost some income, but my prior years’ earnings and my wife’s support mean that I am comfortable enough.  No one promised me great wealth.

I know almost nothing of Snowden’s living conditions in Russia, but he seems to have his following (at least 2.4 million on Twitter) and supporters.  He may be stuck in Russia for a long time, but many others are too.  Life goes on.

What matters, it seems to me, is not the whistleblower – whether she is exceptional, moral, courageous, correct in all her allegations, or properly valued and rewarded in the end.  Our peers are for the most part no more exceptional than we are; we all fail often in our morality, our courage, and our wisdom; and life promised none of us an easy time.

Regardless of the eventual outcome, our task is always to investigate, understand, and try to improve the world in whatever ways we can.  And to be persistent.  Luck, inherent capabilities, personality, and experience threw Snowden into a highly unusual situation, and he performed well although the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was not pleased.