Wrongdoing and Intentionality
The ten HomeFirst issues that I reported over the course of a year were impressive in their number. The potential financial exposure was nearly $4
million, more than enough to trigger bankruptcy if repayment were demanded
although there was no reason to think that prompt repayment would be
necessary. How could a respected
nonprofit have strayed so far – as I claimed to be the case – from expected
norms?
The Finance Committee met in April 2014 to discuss the results
from the compliance program. My
presentation referred to 17 compliance problems that I had identified during my
reviews since October, not counting the County overbilling (1st Issue), the HUD liability (5th Issue) and the City of San Jose advance (7th Issue) but including some that were more minor. The scope and intentionality of the violations
was startling, I said. After the
meeting, the team that had decided two weeks earlier to fire me – CEO Jenny and
the Executive Committee of the Board – crafted an email from the Treasurer asking
whether I had information to support my allegation of intentionality.
Social psychology has grown an industry to describe how
people who are basically good can do bad things. Sometimes people commit wrongs because of those
around them (the “bad barrel” theory)[1]. People are driven sometimes by selfish
emotions and other times by reasoned good intentions[2]. Or maybe they lack some necessary information[3]. Or they fall as innocent victims of their
natural egocentricity[4]. After the fact, the behavior can be rationalized
as not so wrong, not so harmful, or not so uncommon[5]. A long list of explanations is available to
dissolve the assignment of intentionality.
HomeFirst staff and Board members wanted to help the
homeless. If wrongs were done, they were
intended to help the clients, even if a secondary effect was harm done to
different sets of clients, funders or employees. We did not conduct the New Start program in
order to deny individuals compensation (10th Issue), even though we recognized that a
significant consequence of the program was to minimize our costs. We did not keep the money from HUD, the
County and the City of San Jose maliciously, but because giving it back would
harm our clients by damaging HomeFirst.
We acted as we did in the shelter not in order to violate licensing
regulations (3rd Issue); that was just collateral damage.
Whether HomeFirst’s intent to do good demonstrated the absence
of simultaneous intent to do harm can be debated. Justice Oliver Holmes contended, “if the
manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm follows, we say that
it is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so great, but still
considerable, we say that the harm is done negligently; if there is no apparent
danger, we call it mischance.[6]”
The Food Handler Card issue (8th Issue) was small and little considered
so perhaps it fell into the mischance category.
In the years leading up to my internal disclosures, we had little
perception of the harm we might be doing in overbilling the County, in not
licensing the shelter, and in not compensating the New Start clients, so
perhaps they too were mischance events even if they had larger
consequences. On the other hand, the
EHAP violations (6th Issue) might have been foreseeable, so maybe we crossed into negligence there. The violation of master
leasing requirement and the failure to return the HUD money and the City of San
Jose’s advance at the end of its contract were committed knowing that one party
would be harmed in order to benefit the company, and we were deeper into
malicious territory, it seemed to me.
In 1995, Francois Holloway and an accomplice were arrested
for stealing three cars from drivers at gunpoint plus other related
crimes. They were charged with
carjacking “with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm,” a federal
crime. Holloway admitted that they stole
the cars and would have used the gun if the drivers had given them any trouble,
but he claimed that they did not undertake the crimes with the unconditional
intent to shoot the drivers and so were not guilty of the federal crime. Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of the
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, concluded that Holloway bore a conditional
intent to cause serious harm to the drivers if they refused to surrender their
cars and upheld Holloway’s conviction of the federal offense[7].
Unlike Holloway, HomeFirst desired to do good, not to
steal. On the other hand, like Holloway,
we were willing to harm, if necessary, by denying wages to employees, or by using
deceptive means to take taxpayer money; we would do so to avoid costs that
would worsen our financial position.
My April 2014 response to the Treasurer’s email contended
that our intentionality was demonstrated, if not proven, by several behaviors:
·
Failing to comply with a requirement because it
would be expensive to do so
·
Deciding not to address one violation until
another violation was resolved
·
“Forgetting” to take corrective actions that were
known to be required
·
Demanding an extended investigation to delay
addressing a violation, and
·
Delaying corrective action until after an action
by another entity, who was reasonably judged unlikely to act
In a message crafted again with the rest of his team, the
Treasurer replied that compliance was important to HomeFirst and management was
working through violations diligently based on their seriousness and clarity
and on available resources. Others on
the team would express similar sentiments to me in the coming weeks, speaking
in a professional voice as to a public audience.
On the same day the Treasurer sent his reply, Jenny
forwarded to him job references for the woman who would replace me.
Lesson for the whistleblower: those accused of wrongdoing will
insist they had no intent to do wrong, if wrong was done, and they are diligently
pursuing corrective action, as appropriate.
[1] Kish-Gephart, Jennifer J., David A.
Harrison, and Linda Klebe Trevino. “Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: Meta-Analytic Evidence
About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work.” Journal of Applied Psychology. 95.1
(2010): 1-31
[2] Tenbrunsel, Ann E. and
Kristin Smith-Crowe. “Ethical
Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going.” The
Academy of Management Annals. 2.1 (2008): 545–607
[4] Tenbrunsel,
Ann E., Kristina A. Diekmann, Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni and Max H. Bazerman.
“The
Ethical Mirage: A Temporal Explanation as to Why We Aren’t as Ethical as We
Think We Are.” Harvard Business School Working Paper
08-012. 2009
[5] Anand, Vikas, Blake E. Ashforth, and
Mahendra Joshi. “Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in
Organizations.” Academy of
Management Executive. 18.2 (May 2004): 39-53
[6] Black, Lisa Gasbarre. “Double Effect and U.S. Supreme Court
Reasoning.” The National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (Spring 2011): 41-48
No comments:
Post a Comment