What Do We Hope To Achieve? (Part 1)
Whistleblowers and their supporters hold that whistleblowing
is a prosocial
activity[1] undertaken to benefit nearly all of us by identifying wrongs so they can be corrected,
making the world a better place. Those
who justify retaliation against whistleblowers argue that those do-good
contentions are a ruse and the real reason for disclosures is to harm the
organization and benefit themselves. For
them, whistleblowers are loose cannons from whom the organization must protect
itself[2].
When I launched what would become my whistleblowing venture,
my interest was technical rather than either prosocial or harmful to the
company. I had identified a
billing mistake that simply needed to be fixed. Like many who become whistleblowers[3],
I was just doing my job.
HomeFirst’s CEO and Board Chair responded to the overbilling
problem, which could have led to a $140,000 repayment, by trying to limit future
disclosures in order to protect the financially vulnerable company. Early on – some ten months before she would
fire me – an adversarial relationship formed between the company and its
whistleblower. On neither side was
morality or ethics a determining factor.
Four weeks after identifying the billing violation, I raised
the question of licensure
at a large HomeFirst location.
Again, the issue was a peculiar one that the CEO saw as a threat to
HomeFirst. This time, however, I was
aware that I was stepping into a dark territory, and she blew up, as might be
expected under the circumstances.
Nearly all of the misdeeds identified by whistleblowers are
violations of law, regulation, or contract.
As such, they lead us to a technical question: does an
activity violate some rule or another? As
for any white collar criminal[4],
HomeFirst’s intention
to violate rules was ambiguous and could only be teased from its past actions. Whether or not legal guilt was proven by its
intent, the organization would be harmed in some fashion if forced
into compliance.
While it fends off harm from the whistleblower, the
organization denies that any rule was broken.
The issue is a mere technicality; it belongs to a world of banalities[5],
not ethics. Managers begin an
investigation that could last indefinitely, and they likely retaliate against
the whistleblower. Their decisions feel tactical,
not ethical. When HomeFirst’s attorney Bob Shuman advised
Board members to fire me, no moral analysis was involved. His was a business decision to rid the
company of someone who could sabotage the company by revealing more violations.
When I poked at the CEO with the licensing problem, I
followed a pattern of jabs I had made earlier concerning what I considered
unrealistic budget assumptions; digs about the company’s failure to disclose
disappointing client results from its social service programs; and cuts about the
continuing financial losses. I was
evidently no ethical soldier doing my duty; baser motives were at stake.
Once we set aside the notion that the whistleblower is a
moral hero who speaks truth to power and exposes corruption, we are left to
wonder what whistleblowers hope to achieve.
Beginning in frustration, we whistleblowers may hope to
wreck a sort of vengeance on the organization or its leaders, and we may
succeed to a great or lesser extent. During
the past five years, the Securities and
Exchange Commission awarded whistleblowers more than $100 million out of
more than $500 million in sanctions against companies. Since 2007, the IRS
has collected $3.4 billion as a result of whistleblower tips and paid out
$465 million in awards to tipsters. In 2016 alone, the U.S.
Department of Justice collected $4.7 billion from companies as a result of
False Claims Act suits by whistleblowers; $31.3 billion has been collected from
offenders since 2009.
Those global successes sum the happy results of many individuals.
Anonymous whistleblowers provided information
that led to the conviction
of Dr. Robert Windsor for filing medical claims for services he did not
provide. In addition to taking a jail
sentence, Windsor agreed
to pay the U.S. Department of Justice $20 million in settlement of whistleblowers’
suits under the False Claims Act case. A
portion of the amount will be paid to the whistleblowers as a reward for their
information.
James
Crowley, an attorney and manager at Chicago State University, was fired
after he identified misdeeds by the university president and responded to an
FOIA request concerning the actions. The
president retired in the hubbub. Although not involving a government reward, after seven
years Crowley's suit resulted in a $2 million win, which was later increased by $1
million after the university failed to pay as ordered. The university is suing its attorneys for their performance in the case.
The less satisfying results of other actions test our hopes
for retribution. [To continue.]
[1]
For example, Dozier, Janielle Brinker and Marcia P. Miceli. “Potential Predictors of Whistle-Blowing: A Prosocial Behavior
Perspective.” Academy of Management Review 10.4 (1985):
823-836. Miceli,
Marcia P., Janet P. Near, and Terry Morehead Dworkin. Whistle-blowing in Organizations. New
York: Rutledge. 2008
[2]
For example, Sanford
Wadler and comments by HomeFirst’s CEO to its
Board and the advice
of its attorney.
[3]
For example, Sandra
Black, Richard
Bowen, Cynthia
Cooper, Mona
Hanna-Attisha, Jesselyn
Radack, Curtis
Rookaird
[4] Friedrichs, David O. Trusted
Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society. 3rd
ed. Belmont, Cal.: Thomson Higher Education. 2007
[5] Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann
in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Revised and enlarged edition. New York:
Penguin Books. 1994
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