Friday, April 1, 2016

Compliance Systems That Fail (Part 2)

Compliance Systems That Fail (Part 2)

External Auditors

In the years following the 2007 engagement of Burr Pilger & Mayer (BPM) engagement as its new auditors, HomeFirst’s risks decreased, contracts continued, and communications with the auditors were reasonably transparent.  In our annual management representation letter, Jenny and I attested that we had discussed with the auditors everything that we should have done.  A comfortable relationship developed between BPM and management, audits ran smoothly, and the fees we paid decreased.  But that comfortable arrangement also increased the possibility that BPM would not investigate matters as closely as others might.

Fear of losing revenue can sometimes lead auditors to yield where they should not, intentionally or as a result of unconscious moral slippage.   Aware of that risk, audit committees often request that the audit partner in charge rotate periodically, or they may replace the firm itself.  BPM, however, was too small to easily accommodate the rotation of the audit partner.  After five years together, the Audit Committee requested bids from competing audit firms, all of whom were more expensive, and we renewed our comfortable relationship with BPM.

In the standard language suggested by the AICPA, management is responsible for preparing financial statements consistent with generally accepted accounting principles and for maintaining a system of controls to ensure the accuracy of the statements.  The auditor’s responsibility is to express an opinion on the statements based on testing standards, but it declines to opine on the effectiveness of the company’s controls.  Despite these intended responsibilities, a critical question for financial and operating management is “will the auditors find it?” or, as Jenny asked about compliance issues, “did someone else bring this up?” 

Nonprofits that receive significant federal funding – more than $500,000 in years through 2014 and $750,000 afterward – must have an audit compliant with OMB Circular A-133, “Audits of State, Local Governments and Non-Profit Organizations.”   For readers of BPM’s A-133 audit report, the absence of findings of material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in its controls and of questioned costs implied that the company complied with whatever it needed to be compliant. 

The reality of A-133 audits was less compelling.  BPM reduced its charges to HomeFirst by conducting risk-based audits, meaning that it focused on areas that were identified as risky in past audits or in discussions with the Audit Committee or management.  Further, BPM was required to perform testing only on selected major grants in excess of $300,000.  In the 2014 audit, BPM’s two-person team reviewed sampled client files and transactions with respect to 9 grants with total revenue of $2.2 million, as representative of 30 government grants and total revenue of $10.8 million.  The three days of field work were deemed sufficient under the circumstances.

Despite the oversight structure mandated by the California Nonprofit Integrity Act, HomeFirst committed its $1.2 million over-billing of HUD grants after the law was passed, the Audit Committee was established, and an external auditor was hired.  That egregious error arose from management’s failure to correctly bill its contracts, HUD’s failure to effectively monitor the company’s billings, and the auditors’ failure to effectively audit the company’s accounts until the problem became clear during the 2006 audit.

Most of the HomeFirst wrongs that I alleged fell into a class of violations that are not easily detected without a whistleblower’s assistance.  They were wrongs that escaped detection by BPM’s audit procedures, on which readers of the financial statements relied to judge our performance.  Limitations inherent in the external audit and the other layers of formal compliance oversight can enable corporate culture to dominate the ethical practices of the organization[1].


Even more than its formal policies and reporting structures, an organization’s culture determines how it responds to ethical challenges.  Company culture is reflected in the ways employees are recruited and trained, how they dress and present themselves, how they interact with each other, and how business is conducted and decisions are made[2].  More than just a set of behaviors, culture represents “the way we do things around here” in order to solve problems and meet organizational goals[3].   An organization’s ethical culture transcends the personal values of its managers and the operational goals of growth and profitability.  Absent a culture of positive ethical values, the organization can become unhinged during periods of stress[4], like the stress that afflicted HomeFirst in 2014. 

In some company cultures, an apparently well-developed compliance program is viewed as a get-out-of-jail card that reduces the risk of indictment and minimizes the legal consequences of wrongdoing that is caught[5].  In the absence of agreed metrics for determining the effectiveness of corporate compliance programs, managers and board members can contend that they are highly ethical despite evidence to the contrary.  For a company that endeavors to do good in the community, faith in its ethical purpose bleeds into a confidence that its compliance initiatives are honestly implemented.

The presence of a compliance system can actually lead to the occurrence of more unethical behavior[6].   Company managers may view penalties for violations simply as another set of costs that is weighed against the cost of compliance[7].  HomeFirst’s compliance program assured managers they would always have an opportunity to fix their files prior to my visits, they would be never disciplined for violations, and violations were immaterial unless an external authority brought them forward.  By doing so, it may have fostered violations rather than compliance.

Like more than 90% of similarly sized nonprofits[8], HomeFirst possessed key governance policies.  It did not have a whistleblower hotline or an independent party to evaluate complaints of complaints, but neither did many other small and medium sized companies.  Despite an impressive compliance structure and an honorable passion to serve the needs of the poor and change the world, HomeFirst, I believe, committed acts that should have been handled much better and allowed its several reinforcing controls to fail under the weight of its culture.

Whistleblowers attempt to work within a system of official rules and with designated authorities.  They are defeated by multiple systemic failures, by people who do not play fair, and by cultures that overwhelm control systems.





[1] Bazerman, Max H. and Ann E. Tenbrunsel. Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do about It. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2011
[2] Sims, Ronald R. and William I. Sauser. “Toward a Better Understanding of the Relationships among Received Wisdom, Groupthink, and Organizational Ethical Culture.” Journal of Management Policy and Practice 14.4 (August 2013): 75-90
[3] Martin, M. Jason. ’’That’s the Way We Do Things Around Here’: An Overview of Organizational Culture.”  Electronic Journal of Academic and Special Librarianship.  7.1 (Spring 2006)
[4] McCoy, Bowen H. “The Parable of the Sadhu .” In Ethics in Practice: Managing the Moral Corporation. Kenneth R. Andrews (ed.). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 1989
[5] Laufer, William S.  Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds: The Failure of Corporate Criminal Liability.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2006
[6] Ibid
[7] Tenbrunsel, Ann E. and Kristin Smith-Crowe. “Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going.” The Academy of Management Annals. 2.1 (2008): 545–607

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