Thursday, April 28, 2016

The Failure of Expected Protections (Part 2)

The Failure of Expected Protections (Part 2)

With all these state protections, what results do whistleblowers achieve?  In cases of public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, it is impossible to say because there is no central database (even within states) of the results from these cases and settlements are typically hidden by nondisclosure agreements.  The U.S. Department of Labor reports on complaints it receives regarding about 17 federal statutes, but the outcomes are not encouraging.  Of the 26,421 complaints that resulted in determinations from 2006 through 2015, the DoL figured that 24% of the outcomes were favorable to the complainants, including settlements and referrals to different agencies. 

The New Hampshire Department of Labor’s 2011-2013 Biennial Report (the most recent available) on its Whistleblowers’ Protection Act activity said that of 61 cases that were closed, just one was found valid[1].  The whistleblower success rate in New York is about 21%[2], including settlements. 

California’s Department of Industrial Relations, which ignored my minimum wage complaint involving HomeFirst and which oversees whistleblower complaints, issues annual reports concerning the outcomes of all complaints filed with it.  About 85% of the cases submitted to the DIR are settled or withdrawn before a decision is rendered, which may not be surprising since the average time-to-decision is about two years.  Of cases that resulted in decisions, just 17% of complaints were found valid, amounting to about 3% of the cases submitted from 2006 through 2014[3].

These results were not what I expected when I began my whistleblowing project.  I was sure that I would be vindicated, if not about each of the violations then certainly about my termination.  Corporations and some writers, such as Sisella Bok[4], begin with a suspicion that the whistleblower has impure motives; HomeFirst claimed that of me.  It appears that the legal system works with that suspicion in mind.

Corporations that retaliate against whistleblowers benefit from the difficulty in proving white-collar crimes: three crucial determinants of a guilty finding – (a) intent to do harm or willful negligence that caused harm; (b) a direct causal link between action (or inaction) and harm; and (c) the time frame for the harmful activity – can be difficult to establish[5].  For each of the HomeFirst issues that I raised, management denied any intent to cause harm; it pointed to its compliance system as proof of its honorable motives.  Time frames were smudged as actions once considered innocent were subsequently challenged as wrong, and actions initially wrong were forgiven by authorities.  If improper actions were committed, the company claimed it was on its way to repairing them.

Retaliation against the whistleblower must, nearly always, be based on circumstantial evidence that is subjected to conflicting interpretations.  A whistle is blown, and the whistleblower is fired.  Directly proving a causal connection is impossible for most whistleblowers.  Facts are introduced or manufactured by the company to justify its actions: the whistleblower was the wrongdoer.  When evidence is presented in the form of emails and private communications of the company decision makers, it may be challenged as “unclean” and improperly obtained, as my attorney considered the files I brought forward.  Then the whistleblower is caught in a Catch-22 situation where having proof of the company’s malicious intent means that the company is innocent.

In all but a few jurisdictions, resolution of a whistleblower’s claim that retaliation occurred must resolved through the civil court system.  Seldom do authorities have the power impose a binding decision on the parties.  As a result, most claims end in settlements, which the DoL, for one, considers a successful outcome for the claimants.  But I can attest that a settlement, even if negotiated by one’s attorney, is not necessarily a successful outcome for the whistleblower.

The results that become public are the larger, more newsworthy qui tam suits – federal cases in which the government joins in the whistleblower suit and settlements are in the millions of dollars – and not the small complaints settled in secret, dismissed, or simply abandoned after they dragged on for years.  State regulations provide a framework for whistleblower protection that mostly fails those who expect that right will win in the end.





[2] http://www.dhr.ny.gov/ for years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015
[4] Bok, Sisella. “Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility.” New York University Education Quarterly 11.4 (1980): 2-10
[5] Friedrichs, David O. Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society. 3rd ed. Belmont, Cal.: Thomson Higher Education. 2007

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