Whistleblowing and Social Activism
Whistleblowing is fraught with uncertainty. We are troubled by questions. Were the whistleblower’s intent were pure
enough[1]? Was the misdeed bad enough to justify
betrayal of his colleagues[2]? Was his proof was sufficient[3]? Did the organization really retaliate against
him[4]?
Clarity seems possible in restricted cases. HomeFirst’s violation
of California licensing rules, for example.
My external disclosure followed months of inaction by management. I acted after lengthy research on the law and
the company’s actions. The Board decided
to fire me two days after I revealed my disclosure. Pretty clear.
Also straightforward: Katrina
Brown, a Detroit teacher, complained about lead- and copper-tainted water
at John R.
King, a K-8 where 98% of students are black and 71% are poor. She became vocal about overcrowding and
overheated classrooms. That triggered reprimands,
a poor performance review, and transfer to a school far from her home. Then she was fired.
Where wrongdoing is widespread, things get trickier. Brown’s April 2016 objections to King school
conditions fell on the heels of district-wide
teacher protests over racially biased uses of dwindling resources. HomeFirst’s licensing violation was just one
of eight
infractions I disclosed externally[5]
and a longer list of
compliance violations discussed with the Board two months before my final
day.
Multiple misdeeds can emerge from a culture that encourages
wrongdoing[6]. We saw that in Enron. More recently Wells Fargo’s
culture was blamed for its wide-spread false-accounts scandal. Then came evidence that Wells had vastly
understated the extent of that fraud.
And evidence that it charged borrowers
for insurance they had not requested.
And it improperly
changed mortgage terms. Only time
spent in research, it seems, limits the length of the list of Wells’ wrongs.
When culture is the core problem, managers like to claim
their acts are the result of legitimate strategies – as Wells Fargo declared –
or necessity – as Detroit’s bankrupt school district complained. Or the fight against terrorism for the New
York Police Department.
Bobby
Farid Hadid was granted asylum from Algeria in the mid-90s. He sold hotdogs on New York City
streets. He drove a cab. He fixed copiers and got married. Grateful for his new home, he joined the NYPD
after 9/11. He advanced steadily in
rank. He joined the vice squad. He became a member of the Joint Terrorism
Task Force working with the FBI.
Acting as an interpreter in a long cold case, he traveled to
Paris. He convinced the prime suspect’s
girlfriend to turn on him. Kargu’s
confession won praise for Hadid and the other two officers involved.
Back in New York he was invited the join the NYPD’s Citywide
Debriefing Team which gathered terrorism-related intelligence. They recruited people guilty of minor crimes. Hadid was told they wanted individuals who
could go to mosques, bodegas, and other places his people went. Sources should listen and bring back data.
After a few months, Hadid decided that the unit’s approach
was wrong and completely stupid. He
would not be a part of that. He objected. He spent more time in his office. The unit’s senior officers met to discuss
their suspicions about him. He traveled
alone a lot. His office was close to
where confidential documents were kept.
His reports revealed discrepancies.
So NYPD transferred him to a Queens precinct that had a lot of Muslims.
Kargu’s trial began in October 2010. His defense fabricated a romance between
Hadid and Kargu’s girlfriend. After the
conviction, NYPD began an internal investigation into Hadid. They took away his gun, badge, and
uniform. They stuck him in a room with
other police outcasts to watch surveillance videos.
At Hadid’s trial in October 2012, the judge found him guilty
of perjury in his testimony against Kargu.
With the felony he couldn’t sell hotdogs or drive a cab. It took two years for Hadid to get the
conviction vacated. After he did, he asked
to be reinstated. But the NYPD cited performance
issues. He was a problem child. His lawsuit for malicious persecution was
dismissed. Hadid is appealing but his
chances are dim.
Other Muslims in the NYPD report hostile responses if they,
for example, wear beards for religious reasons or speak Arabic on a phone
call. Failing to assimilate spawns resentment,
they find.
Hadid does not present himself as a whistleblower. Still his experience is familiar to
whistleblowers. Dedicated to the mission
of his organization, he saw behavior that was wrong. He called it out and was punished. The organization claimed its behavior was necessary
to do its job and concluded he should be fired.
Whether he can rightly be called a whistleblower is
uncertain. He suffered as a result of
the NYPD’s – and America’s – possibly justifiable fear of Islamic
radicals. And their unjustified
suspicion of all Muslims. Hadid’s
supporters might defend his whistleblowing, but even more they are activists in
favor of a just society.
Other minority groups – people without power – report ordeals
that match Hadid’s. Police disproportionately
arrest and shoot black men. Dominant
whites have long demanded for assimilation from Asians, Latinos, and other
immigrants to America. Male-run
businesses have long preferred to pay
heterosexual males more. Corporate
managers reward themselves before their underlings. The wealthy justify policies that further
concentrate treasure close to themselves.
Social activism grew over the past sixty years to fight
abuses based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and economic
position. And with it, whistleblowing expanded
dramatically over the past forty.
The line between whistleblowing and activism is blurred. Joel
Clement called himself a whistleblower when he exposed the Trump
administration’s anti-climate-science stance to
the few who had been unaware. Susan
Fowler sounded like a whistleblower when she described sexism at Uber. Then she went further as an activist,
presenting an amicus curiae brief against
arbitration agreements that block collective employee actions against illegal
employment practices[7].
Like all activists, whistleblowers do what we can and deal
with the issues that touch us. We fail
only when we are silent.
[6] Ashforth, Blake E.,
Dennis A. Gioia, Sandra L Robinson and Linda K. Trevino. “Re-Viewing Organizational
Corruption.” Academy of Management Review. 33.3
(2008): 670-684; Campbell,
Jamie-Lee and Anja S. Goritz. “Culture Corrupts! A Qualitative Study of
Organizational Culture in Corrupt Organizations.” Journal of Business Ethics 120 (2014): 291–311; Kish-Gephart, Jennifer J., David A.
Harrison, and Linda Klebe Trevino. “Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad
Barrels: Meta-Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work.” Journal of Applied Psychology. 95.1
(2010): 1-31; Palmer, Donald. Normal
Organizational Wrongdoing.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012
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